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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellants, Donald Bogusz ("Bogusz") and John O'Rourke 
("O'Rourke"), appeal criminal sentences imposed on them by the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.1  
The district court sentenced Bogusz to 120 months and O'Rourke to 
168 months of imprisonment for their criminal involvement with a 
                     
1
.  O'Rourke also appeals his conviction.  In that respect, he 
argues:  (1) that the district court erred in refusing to sever 
his trial from his co-defendants and (2) that the variance 
between the proof at trial and the indictment unduly burdened 
him.  Upon review, we hold that these issues lack merit. 
  
methamphetamine laboratory.  Because the district court 
erroneously interpreted the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(the "Guidelines"),2 it miscalculated Bogusz's and O'Rourke's 
sentences.  Therefore, we will vacate both their sentences and 
remand for resentencing. 
 
 I.  Background 
 Because this appeal focuses on sentencing, only a 
summary of the facts material to the sentencing issues is needed.  
On August 29, 1991, a federal grand jury returned an indictment 
against twelve individuals, including Bogusz and O'Rourke, 
charging them with participation in a scheme to manufacture and 
distribute methamphetamine.  Bogusz located and obtained 
glassware and phenylacetic acid, a methamphetamine precursor, for 
the methamphetamine production process.  O'Rourke served as a 
"plumber."  In that capacity, he unclogged drains that became 
blocked during the methamphetamine manufacturing process. 
 Bogusz and O'Rourke received methamphetamine as part of 
the consideration for their services.  O'Rourke received four of 
the eight pounds of methamphetamine produced while he worked on 
the pipes and Bogusz got one pound.  The methamphetamine produced 
was described as "sticky" and "like caramel" indicating its poor 
quality.  In fact, Bogusz gave half of his methamphetamine to a 
                     
2
.  Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Guidelines are 
to the 1991 version, the Guidelines in effect at the time of the 
appellants' sentencing.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(4) (West 
1985). 
  
co-conspirator and returned the other half because of its poor 
quality. 
 On March 17, 1992, Bogusz pled guilty under a plea 
agreement to a conspiracy to distribute more than two pounds of 
phenylacetic acid, a listed chemical, knowing that it would be 
used to manufacture methamphetamine, a controlled substance, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(d)(2) (West Supp. 1994).  On 
May 14, 1992, after a jury trial, O'Rourke was convicted of a 
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp. 1994) 
and possession with intent to distribute in excess of one 
kilogram of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. 
§ 841(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994). 
 At Bogusz's sentencing, the district court adopted a 
recommendation in the probation office's Presentence Report (the 
"PSR") to apply a higher base offense level than the one 
stipulated in Bogusz's plea agreement.  Bogusz and the government 
had stipulated to a base offense level of 24, applying U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.11(d)(3); but the PSR recommended applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 
with a base offense level of 34.  Using a cross-reference from 
section 2D1.11(c)(1) to section 2D1.1, the district court decided 
the base offense level was 34.  Because phenylacetic acid is not 
included in section 2D1.1's Sentencing Table, use of section 
2D1.1 required conversion of the phenylacetic acid quantities to 
those of a substance on the table.  The probation officer 
preparing the PSR converted the eight pounds of phenylacetic acid 
  
to two pounds of methamphetamine, the amount of methamphetamine 
produced from the phenylacetic acid. 
 The PSR also recommended that sentencing be based upon 
"methamphetamine (actual)" as opposed to "methamphetamine."3  The 
base offense level for two pounds of methamphetamine (actual) 
under section 2D1.1 was 34.  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5) (Drug 
Quantity Table).  This ultimately resulted in Bogusz's 120-month 
sentence.  Sentencing under section 2D1.11(d)(3), with its base 
level of 24, in accord with the stipulation in the plea 
agreement, would have resulted in a sentencing range of 51 to 63 
months.  See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).  Applying 
a two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a 
criminal history category of III to this offense level, the 
Guidelines indicated that Bogusz should be sentenced to 151 to 
188 months of imprisonment.  Id.  Because the statutory maximum 
sentence under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(d) is 120 months, the district 
court sentenced Bogusz to 120 months.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) 
("Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than 
the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily 
authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence."); 
see also United States v. Donley, 878 F.2d 735, 741 (3d Cir. 
1989) ("the underlying statute shall control in case of conflict 
with the Sentencing Guidelines"), cert. denied., 494 U.S. 1058 
(1990). 
                     
3
.  Section 2D1.1 subjects methamphetamine (actual) to a more 
severe base offense level.  What the phrase methamphetamine 
(actual) means is an issue in these appeals which we discuss 
infra in Part III-A. 
  
 At O'Rourke's sentencing, the district court again 
adopted the PSR's recommendation to apply U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 and 
again decided that the methamphetamine was methamphetamine 
(actual).  Based on the eight pounds of methamphetamine produced 
when he worked on the pipes, O'Rourke received a base offense 
level of 38, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3), but the district court 
granted O'Rourke a four point offense level reduction for his 
mitigating role.  See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a).  Using a criminal 
history category of II and an offense level of 34, the Guidelines 
put O'Rourke in a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months 
imprisonment.  See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table).  
O'Rourke was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 168 months 
imprisonment on each count.  Both Bogusz and O'Rourke filed 
timely notices of appeal. 
 
 II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
these criminal cases pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3231 (West 1985).  
We have appellate jurisdiction over this consolidated appeal 
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993) (review of final decisions) 
and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742 (West 1985) (review of sentences). 
 Under the Guidelines, we review a district court's 
findings of fact for the limited purpose of determining whether 
they are clearly erroneous.  United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 
659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 
961, 964 (3d Cir. 1992); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West 
Supp. 1994) (reviewing courts "shall accept the findings of fact 
  
of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous").  
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when "the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed."  United States v. 
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  Findings involving 
mixed questions of law and fact are subjected to a more demanding 
scrutiny "approaching de novo review as the issue moves from one 
of strictly fact to one of strictly law."  Belleteire, 971 F.2d 
at 964 (quoting United States v. Murillo, 933 F.2d 195, 198 (3d 
Cir. 1991)).  When the essential facts are not in dispute, our 
review of the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines, 
like our review of a statute's interpretation, is plenary.  See 
United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1990). We 
must, however, defer to the Sentencing Commission's 
interpretation of the Guidelines unless "it violates the 
Constitution or a Federal Statute, or is inconsistent with, or a 
plainly erroneous interpretation of, that [provision]."  Stinson 
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993). 
 
 III.  Discussion 
 Bogusz raises four challenges to the district court's 
sentences.  O'Rourke joins with him in two.  First, both contend 
that the district court erred in finding the unanalyzed 
methamphetamine, upon which their sentencing was based, to be 
methamphetamine (actual).  Second, both argue that the district 
court erred in tacitly finding that the methamphetamine was 
Dextro-methamphetamine ("D-methamphetamine") as opposed to Levo-
  
methamphetamine ("L-methamphetamine").  Third, Bogusz argues that 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 does not apply to violations of 21 U.S.C.A. 
§ 841(d)(2) (West Supp. 1994), and that U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11 is the 
only Guidelines provision applicable to this offense.  Fourth, 
Bogusz contends that the government is violating its plea 
agreement with him by arguing for affirmance of the district 
court's sentence.  We will address each challenge in turn. 
 
 A.  Guidelines' Treatment of Methamphetamine 
 To apply U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, a sentencing court must 
first determine whether the substance in question is 
methamphetamine or methamphetamine (actual).  This determination 
involves two related issues.  We must first consider whether the 
methamphetamine that Bogusz and O'Rourke helped produce was 
"pure" methamphetamine, a necessary condition for its 
classification as methamphetamine (actual), and then the more 
complex question of whether the government must also prove that 
the substance is D- or L-methamphetamine. 
 
 1.  Methamphetamine (Actual) 
          The difference between methamphetamine and 
methamphetamine (actual) is highly significant for sentencing 
purposes:  methamphetamine (actual) is subject to an offense 
level ten times greater than methamphetamine.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1, comment.(n.10) (Drug Equivalency Table) (one gram of 
methamphetamine (actual) is treated as the equivalent of ten 
grams of marijuana while one gram of methamphetamine is 
  
equivalent to one gram of marijuana); see also United States v. 
Lande, No. 94-8038, 1994 WL 627425, at *5 n.1 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 
1994); United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 744 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing the effect on sentencing) (citing United States v. 
Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 789 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied 
sub. nom., Jessee v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1234 (1994). 
 The district court defined methamphetamine (actual) as 
"pure methamphetamine."4  The court then explained: 
 Well, pure is how you define "pure." I'm 
defining it, "pure," as uncut product, not 
whether the product was good product or bad 
product.  Now that may be erroneous, in which 
case I'll be reversed on appeal.  But the 
fact of the matter is that a caramel-like 
mess to me is not the critical point; the 
point is, that's what came out of the 
manufacturing process, and it had not yet 
been cut. 
 
 
Bogusz Appendix at 85.  Bogusz and O'Rourke argue that 
methamphetamine (actual) refers to the percentage purity of the 
end product.  That is, they argue that methamphetamine (actual) 
refers to the net amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride present 
in the substance upon which sentencing is based. 
 The Guidelines' commentary defines methamphetamine 
(actual) as "the weight of the controlled substance, itself, 
contained in the mixture or substance."  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), 
comment.(n.*).5  The Guidelines also provide the following 
                     
4
.  Prior to the 1991 amendments, the Guidelines also used the 
term pure instead of actual. See U.S.S.G. App. C., amend. 395.   
5
.  In this respect, the Guidelines' treatment of methamphetamine 
and PCP is contrary to the gross weight method of calculating the 
  
illustrative example:  "a mixture weighing 10 grams containing 
PCP at 50% purity contains 5 grams PCP (actual)."  Id. (under the 
Guidelines, PCP and methamphetamine are treated identically). 
 Unfortunately, the commentary to the Guidelines is 
susceptible to either interpretation of "pure," and each has case 
law support.  Compare United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272, 
1282 (2d Cir.) (holding that "pure" merely means uncut or 
unadulterated), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 146 (1991); United 
States v. Patrick, 983 F.2d 206 (11th Cir. 1993) (same in dicta) 
with Carroll, 6 F.3d at 746 ("the only way to calculate the 
quantity of 'pure methamphetamine' in determining a defendant's 
base offense level under § 2D1.1(c) is to multiply the purity of 
the mixture times the weight"), cert. denied sub. nom., Jessee v. 
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1234 (1994);  United States v. Rusher, 
966 F.2d 868, 880 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 351 
(1992); United States v. Alfeche, 942 F.2d 697, 699 (9th Cir. 
1991) (same); United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 789-90 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (same); see also United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 
122 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that pure methamphetamine does not 
include the weight of impurities). 
 At oral argument, the government argued that adoption 
of the appellants' interpretation would reward them for being 
"poor cooks."  Transcript of Oral Arguments at 46.  This 
contention reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of 
(..continued) 
quantity of all other controlled substances.  See Chapman v. 
United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1926 (1991).  The gross weight 
method is known as a "market oriented approach."  Id. at 1925. 
  
methamphetamine production and the Guidelines' treatment of it.  
Sentencing for methamphetamine drug offenses is intended to 
punish all cooks equally.  Sentencing under methamphetamine 
(actual) punishes particularly good cooks and their employers 
more severely.  Methamphetamine, as produced through normal 
chemical processes, contains a number of impurities.  See 
Spencer, 4 F.3d at 121 (noting that methamphetamine results from 
a "chemical reaction which yields a mixture of methamphetamine 
and various impurities"); United States v. Stoner, 927 F.2d 45, 
47 (1st Cir.) (noting that methamphetamine "virtually never is 
completely pure"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 129 (1991).  The 
initial product can then be processed further to remove these 
impurities.  The purified product, being more concentrated, can 
then be cut into larger quantities for resale.  The 
interpretation Bogusz and O'Rourke urge on us does not reward bad 
cooks; instead, it merely punishes more severely the 
sophisticated cooks who could otherwise manipulate the Guidelines 
by producing smaller quantities of more concentrated 
methamphetamine. 
 The government's reliance on Chapman v. United States, 
111 S. Ct. 1919, 1925 (1991), and its discussion of Congress' 
"market-oriented" approach is also misplaced.  As the Supreme 
Court noted in Chapman, Congress and the Guidelines identified 
methamphetamine and PCP as drugs warranting differential 
treatment with regard to purity and thus provided for their 
unique sentencing scheme.  See id. at 1924.  An interpretation of 
purity that relies upon the treatment of other controlled 
  
substances conflicts with the Guidelines' unique treatment of 
methamphetamine. 
 After consideration of the text and commentary of the 
Guidelines, existing case law and the peculiar sentencing scheme 
for methamphetamine, we hold that methamphetamine (actual) refers 
to the net amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride produced and 
not the gross amount of uncut methamphetamine.  Thus, 
methamphetamine (actual) refers to the net amount of 
methamphetamine hydrochloride after all impurities, waste, by-
products, or cutting agents are removed. 
 The government argues that Bogusz and O'Rourke did not 
show that the methamphetamine "contained a cutting agent, waste 
product, or any substance other than the controlled substance 
itself."  Brief of Appellee at 46.  In essence, the government is 
arguing that defendants bear the burden of showing the portion of 
the substance that is not methamphetamine (actual).  This 
argument fails.  Although the purity of a methamphetamine product 
does not bear on a defendant's guilt or innocence and, thus, does 
not invoke the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970), it does have a profound effect 
on the sentence imposed, and the government bears the burden of 
proving it, albeit by only a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 In some situations, a chemical analysis of the 
substance that indicates its purity may be required for the 
government to meet this burden.  In others, circumstantial 
evidence of purity may be sufficient.  We hold only that the 
  
government must produce evidence of the quantity of 
methamphetamine hydrochloride the mixture in question contains if 
a defendant is to be sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for 
methamphetamine (actual). 
 In this case, some of the evidence produced at trial 
supports the district court's tacit finding of 100% purity.  
Trial testimony showed that the defendants were in possession of 
a functional recipe, proper equipment, and requisite chemicals.  
There was, however, other evidence on the color and consistency 
of the product which indicated poor quality and could have 
supported a finding of impurity.  Manufactured methamphetamine is 
not 100% pure regardless of the sophistication of the equipment.  
Therefore, the government cannot rely solely on the nature of the 
production process and assume that the total product is pure 
methamphetamine which calls for sentencing under methamphetamine 
(actual).  Instead, we think there should be a finding, based on 
evidence, on how much methamphetamine hydrochloride is included 
in the mixture that constitutes the end product.  Because the 
district court failed to make such a finding, we will remand for 
further fact finding on the purity of the product.6 
 
                     
6
.  It has sometimes been suggested that giving the government a 
second chance to make the requisite showing that it was unable to 
achieve originally is inconsistent with the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  This Court, however, has held 
that "sentencing proceedings are not . . . so trial-like as to 
implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause."  Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 
F.3d 451, 458 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. 
Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 94-5891); see also Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 
S. Ct. 948, 957 (1994) (refusing to decide this issue). 
  
 2.  Organic Composition 
 On the second aspect of methamphetamine sentencing, 
both Bogusz and O'Rourke challenge the district court's tacit 
assumption that the methamphetamine was D-methamphetamine as 
opposed to L-methamphetamine.  The two are grossly different in 
physiological effect and, as we shall see, this difference is 
reflected in the Guidelines drug equivalency tables by a factor 
of 250 to 1.  An initial failure of the parties to appreciate the 
chemistry involved and thus to inform the district court of the 
scientific basis for this contention requires us to consider 
whether Bogusz and O'Rourke have waived any issue regarding the 
distinction between D-and L-methamphetamine.  Discussion of the 
principles of organic chemistry that underlie this issue is 
necessary before the problem created by the distinction between 
D- and L-methamphetamine can be understood.  See United States v. 
Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 261-64 (3d Cir.) (pre-Guidelines case 
discussing chemical difference between D- and L-heroin), cert. 
denied sub nom. Stillman v. United States, 464 U.S. 936 (1983). 
 The methamphetamine molecule, like most organic 
molecules, exists in different "isomeric" forms.  Isomers "are 
compounds that have the same molecular formula but different 
structural formulas."  Harold Hart, Organic Chemistry: A Short 
Course 15 (6th ed. 1983) ("Organic Chemistry Text").  Just as 
people are either right- or left-hand dominant, a molecule can 
sometimes exist in right- and left-handed forms.  See Organic 
Chemistry Text at 125-26; Roger A. Hegstrom & Dilip K. Kondepudi, 
The Handedness of the Universe, Scientific American, Jan. 1990, 
  
at 108 ("Hegstrom & Kondepudi Article"); United States v. 
Patrick, 983 F.2d 206, 209 (11th Cir. 1993).  A molecule "that 
exhibits the property of handedness" is called a chiral 
molecule.7  The two forms of the chiral molecules are called 
enantiomers.8 
 Each enantiomer is labelled either Dextro or Levo, or D 
or L.  Hegstrom & Kondepudi Article at 109.  The difference is 
determined by the optical rotation of light.  D is right-handed 
and L is left-handed.  One is the mirror image of the other; that 
is, they are mirror symmetrical.  Id.  Although enantiomers only 
differ with respect to chirality, the human body "is highly 
sensitive to enantiomeric differences."  Id.   For example, the 
thalidomide birth defects of the 1960's resulted because one 
enantiomer of thalidomide stopped morning sickness while the 
other caused birth defects.  Id. at 109-10.9 
                     
7
.  Chirality was discovered in 1847 by Louis Pasteur.  See  
Hegstrom & Kondepudi Article at 108; Organic Chemistry Text at 
127. 
8
.  Thus, enantiomers are isomers that are not identical with 
their mirror image; that is, the enantiomers are 
nonsuperimposable.  Organic Chemistry Text at 121-25.  For 
example, the mirror image of a right hand is not another right 
hand but a left hand.  Id. 
9
.  Not all enantiomers have such disparate effects on the human 
body.  See, e.g., New Jersey v. Cathcart, 589 A.2d 193, 198 (N.J. 
App. Div. 1991) (discussing the similar effects of D- and L-
cocaine); United States v. Puglisi, 790 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir.) 
(same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986); United States v. 
Bockius, 564 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977) (same); United 
States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d. 978, 985 (7th Cir. 1976) (same), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977). 
  
 Methamphetamine exists in these two isomeric forms.10  
L-methamphetamine is a compound that produces little or no 
physiological effect when ingested.  Carroll, 6 F.3d at 743.  
D-methamphetamine, on the other hand, produces the physiological 
effect desired by its users.  Id. 
  The text of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 differentiates only 
between methamphetamine and methamphetamine (actual).  We have 
previously discussed that distinction as it involves drug purity, 
not organic structure.  The question now posed is whether the 
isometric structure of methamphetamine, as well as the net 
quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride, is relevant to 
Guidelines sentencing.  The Guidelines do not differentiate 
between the D- and L- isomers of methamphetamine in the text of 
section 2D1.1, but only in the commentary to it.  There, in the 
Drug Equivalency Tables, L-methamphetamine is treated far less 
severely than either methamphetamine or methamphetamine (actual):  
methamphetamine (actual) by a factor of 250, methamphetamine by a 
factor of 25.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 comment.(n.10) (Drug 
Equivalency Table) (one gram of L-methamphetamine is equivalent 
to 40 grams of marijuana, one gram of methamphetamine is 
equivalent to one kilogram of marijuana, and one kilogram of 
                     
10
.  The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 
735, 743 (11th Cir. 1993), described a third form of 
methamphetamine: DL-methamphetamine.  Standard texts, however, 
seem to recognize only two chemical forms of methamphetamine with 
DL-methamphetamine merely being a combination of the two forms.  
See Organic Chemistry Text at 127 (defining a racemic mixture as 
"a 50:50 mixture of enantiomers").  Our analysis would be 
unaffected if a third form does exist. 
  
methamphetamine (actual) is equivalent to 10 kilograms of 
marijuana).11  With this chemical background in mind, we consider 
first whether the issue raised by this distinction in their 
physiological effect was fairly raised before the district court.  
Bogusz and O'Rourke never used precise chemical terms in arguing 
this question.  They lumped this issue together with their 
arguments on purity when they objected to sentencing based upon 
an unanalyzed substance.  Nevertheless, we conclude that Bogusz's 
and O'Rourke's objections to sentencing based on the unanalyzed 
substance produced at the methamphetamine laboratory fairly 
raised and preserved the issue for appeal. 
 Even if Bogusz and O'Rourke were raising the issue for 
the first time on appeal, we could nevertheless review the trial 
court's findings for plain error.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) 
("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court.").  We believe that under these circumstances the district 
court's interpretation of the Guidelines would be plain error.  
Because of the objections at sentencing, this case differs 
factually from United States v. Peninno, 29 F.3d 572, 580 (11th 
Cir. 1994), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit refused to consider a similar claim because of 
                     
11
.  The Drug Equivalency Tables are generally used only when a 
controlled substance is not listed in the Drug Quantity Table, 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), or when it is necessary to combine different 
controlled substances.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment.(n.10); cf. 
Ammar, 714 F.2d at 263 (upholding heroin conspiracy conviction 
without distinguishing between D- and L- isomers because statute 
did not distinguish them). 
  
the appellant's complete failure to object at sentencing.  
Moreover, considering the gross disparity in sentencing, we 
disagree with the Peninno court's holding that the determination 
of methamphetamine type is entirely a factual question that 
cannot rise to the level of plain error. Id. 
 The Fifth Circuit recently defined a plain error as one 
"so obvious that [a] failure to notice it would seriously affect 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 
proceeding and result in a miscarriage of justice."  United 
States v. Hoster, 988 F.2d 1374, 1380 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting 
United States v. Surasky, 974 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct 1948 (1993)); see also United States v. Olano, 
113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993).  We recognize that the term "plain 
error" normally implies an error that is apparent as well as 
unjust.  See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 
(1936).12  Here, however, we think that the egregiousness of the 
                     
12
.  Rule 56 is sometimes said to require a plain error to be an 
obvious error.  See United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356, 359 
(7th Cir. 1991) (relying exclusively on Justice Scalia's 
dissenting opinion in Pretez v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 
2678 (1991)).  The Supreme Court, however, has defined plain 
errors as errors that "are obvious, or [that] otherwise seriously 
affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the 
judicial proceedings."  Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160.  In United 
States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993), the Supreme Court, 
discussing Rule 52(b), stated that appellate review is available 
only when: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is "plain;" and 
(3) the error affects substantial rights.  Id. at 1776-77.  
"Plain is synonymous with clear or, equivalently, obvious. . . .  
At a minimum, the Court of Appeals cannot correct an error 
pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current 
law."  Id. at 1777 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
Though the present error was not obvious, we think it was clear; 
thus, even if Bogusz's and O'Rourke's failure to appreciate the 
technical chemical basis for their objection was a waiver, we 
  
injustice that would result if the distinction between the two 
isomers is not recognized outweighs the failure of Bogusz and 
O'Rourke to articulate clearly the principles of organic 
chemistry that underlie their objections to the district court's 
application of the Guidelines.13 
 Thus, considering the magnitude of the difference in 
sentencing that could result from the application of the wrong 
organic isomer, we think the sentencing court's failure to make 
this determination would result in a grave miscarriage of 
justice.14  We will thus consider whether the distinction between 
(..continued) 
think the requirements of Rule 52(b) would be met because of the 
great difference in the effect of the two substances that the 
commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) recognizes when it 
distinguishes them by a conversion factor of 250 to 1. 
13
.  Moreover, a sentencing scheme that imposes the same penalty 
on a person who produces a compound with little or no effect as a 
person who produces a potent mind-altering drug would seem 
irrational.  When interpreting the Guidelines, we apply 
traditional canons of statutory construction.  Thus, we will not 
interpret the Guidelines in a manner that leads to irrational 
results when alternative interpretations consistent with the 
objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act are available.  See, 
e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 
(1982).  The Sentencing Reform Act intended to create "an 
effective, fair sentencing system."  U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A intro. 
comment. "To achieve this end, . . . Congress sought 
proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes 
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of 
differing severity."  Id.  
14
.  Because the Guidelines' confusing textual use of the term 
"actual" and its unexplained distinction between the two isomers 
in the commentary's reference to the equivalency table, we cannot 
criticize the district court for failing to appreciate this 
problem.  Some commentators suggest that lawyers generally 
possess "an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy, which ill 
equips them to educate and guide the bench."  Andre A. Moenssens 
et al., Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 7 (3d ed. 1986) 
  
the left- and right-handed isomers of methamphetamine is material 
to the Guidelines sentences that can be legally imposed on Bogusz 
and O'Rourke. 
 In United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 
1993), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit sought to 
separate methamphetamine's purity from the effect of its isomers.  
In that case, the defendant's sentence was based on 
methamphetamine that contained 50% D- and 50% L-methamphetamine.  
Id. at 743.  The Court of Appeals held, "the distinction between 
methamphetamine and [methamphetamine (actual)] refers to the 
relative purity of any methamphetamine compound; it does not 
refer to a particular form of methamphetamine."  Id. at 744.  
Thus, the 50% D- and 50% L-methamphetamine compound could be 100% 
pure for purposes of calculating methamphetamine (actual).  Judge 
Bright dissented from the majority's "drug quality issue."  Id. 
at 747.  Because the Guidelines "caused great confusion due to 
the convoluted chemical rhetoric" required by their application 
in this area, Judge Bright would have affirmed the lower court's 
conclusion that purity should be based on the quantity of 
D-methamphetamine.  Id. at 749.15 
 An isolated literal reading of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) does 
offer some support to the Carroll majority's separation of the 
(..continued) 
(discussing the difficulties experienced by judges in determining 
the admissibility of expert evidence). 
15
.  Judge Bright lamented the complexity and confusion apparent 
in the Guidelines' treatment of methamphetamine.  Carroll, 6 F.3d 
at 749 (Bright, J., dissenting).  We add our voice to his lament. 
  
purity problem from the difference in the effect of the two 
isomers.  We think, however, that such a separation for purposes 
of Guidelines' sentences would obliterate the distinction between 
the effect of the two isomers that the Guidelines' commentary 
recognizes in any case in which the Drug Equivalency Tables are 
not used.  Considering the difference between the physiological 
effect of the two isomers, along with the Sentencing Commission's 
recognition of that difference in its use of conversion factors 
with a 1 to 250 ratio, the disparity in sentencing that would 
result seems to us contrary to one of Congress's primary goals in 
passing the Sentencing Reform Act--the substitution of uniformity 
for disparity in sentencing.16  We think the Guidelines should 
not be construed in a way that results in so greatly irrational a 
disparity.  To illustrate, under Carroll, a defendant convicted 
of one gram of pure L-methamphetamine would have a base offense 
level of 16 with a Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months 
imprisonment.  See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table) 
(assuming a criminal history category of I).  Another defendant 
sentenced for one gram of pure L-methamphetamine and an 
additional 200 grams of marijuana (thus, requiring conversion 
under the Drug Equivalency Table) would have a base offense level 
of 6 and a sentencing range of zero to six months.  See U.S.S.G. 
                     
16
.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 sought to achieve 
"reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide 
disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses 
committed by similar offenders."  U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. 
comment.  
  
Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table) (again, assuming a criminal 
history category of I). 
 Accordingly, we hold that the references to 
methamphetamine and methamphetamine (actual) in the Drug Quantity 
Tables of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) refer solely to quantities of 
D-methamphetamine.  In order to calculate a base offense level 
under section 2D1.1(c) for L-methamphetamine, the substance in 
question must first be converted into marijuana equivalents.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment.(n.10) (noting that the Drug Quantity 
Tables do not include all substances and that the Drug 
Equivalency Tables should be used for those that are not 
included). 
 Because no determination of the isomeric composition of 
methamphetamine was made at sentencing, this issue must also be 
considered on remand.  We again remind the government that it has 
the burden of production and persuasion on this issue and that 
the proper standard for the burden of persuasion is a 
preponderance of the evidence.  The type of proof required to 
satisfy this standard will also vary from case to case.17  In 
                     
17
.  See United States v. Lande, No. 94-8038, 1994 WL 627425, at 
*1-2 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 1994) (affirming a district court's 
finding of D-methamphetamine based upon circumstantial evidence); 
United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(reversing a district court for taking judicial notice that 
methamphetamine was D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
105 (1994); Patrick, 983 F.2d at 210 (requiring the government to 
prove that conviction was based upon D-methamphetamine).  We do 
not think that this standard will create either an insurmountable 
burden or a meaningless hurdle for the government but, rather, 
merely recognizes the distinctions between the organic 
compositions and purity levels of methamphetamine the Guidelines 
require.  We think some evidence of the quantity of each isomer 
  
some cases, the evidence will include a chemical analysis or 
expert testimony.  In others, circumstantial evidence of which 
isomer is present may be sufficient to meet the preponderance of 
the evidence standard.  See United States v. Koonce, 884 F.2d 
349, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming D-methamphetamine 
determination based on circumstantial evidence of defendant's 
prior methamphetamine shipment). 
 
 B.  Section 2D1.11's Cross Reference to 2D1.1 
 Bogusz alone raises the next Guidelines issue.  He 
argues that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 
under section 2D1.11's cross-reference to it.  He contends that 
section 2D1.1 does not apply to violations of 21 U.S.C.A. 
§ 841(d).  Bogusz pled guilty to distribution of a precursor 
chemical knowing that it would be used to manufacture a 
controlled substance but was sentenced for conspiracy to 
unlawfully manufacture the quantity of the controlled substance 
that was produced from the precursor chemicals he delivered.  
(..continued) 
is needed because Congress and the Sentencing Commission deemed 
methamphetamine different enough to warrant this unique 
sentencing scheme.  The inapplicability of the prohibition 
against hearsay to sentencing proceedings, see United States v. 
Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 997 
(1989), should facilitate the production of evidence in the form 
of expert opinion.  Moreover, we do not think precise 
quantitative analysis of the product should be required, only 
some reasonable estimate of the relative amounts of each isomer, 
perhaps inferred from the production method and results generally 
obtained in laboratory experiments using normal production 
methods. 
  
 Bogusz relies primarily on United States v. Voss, 956 
F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1992), a case decided under the Guidelines 
in effect before the amendment adopting section 2D1.11.  In Voss, 
over a strong dissent by Judge Ebel, the court held U.S.S.G. 
§ 2D1.1 inapplicable to violations of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(d).  Id. 
at 1012.  The majority reasoned that its application "would 
insure that almost all violators of section 841(d) would be 
sentenced to the ten year maximum imprisonment, thus turning a 
statutory maximum into a mandatory sentence."  Id. at 1010 
(citations omitted).  The majority refused to interpret the 
Guidelines in a manner that would achieve this result, fearing 
that such an interpretation "would effectively nullify the 
various sections of the Guidelines geared to a particular 
defendant's offense specific conduct."  Id.  
 Since Voss, the Guidelines have been amended and 
section 2D1.11 now clearly applies to violations of section 21 
U.S.C.A. § 841(d).  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11 (Unlawfully 
Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed 
Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy).  We sympathize with the concern 
the Voss majority expressed,18 but we cannot reconcile it with 
                     
18
.  The Voss majority also expressed concern over treating 
section 841(d) violators the same as actual drug manufacturers.  
The Guidelines, as amended since Voss, cross reference to section 
2D1.1 only when the "offense involved unlawfully manufacturing or 
attempting to manufacture a controlled substance . . . ."  
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11(c)(1).  Section 841(d) can be violated by 
conduct not meeting this requirement.  Therefore, we do not 
believe that the Sentencing Commission acted irrationally by 
equating the penalties for these offenses.  In fact, the theory 
behind all inchoate penalties is based on some belief in 
equivalent culpability. 
  
the text of the amended Guidelines.  See United States v. 
O'Leary, 35 F.3d 153, 154 (5th Cir. 1994).  Section 2D1.11(c)(1) 
states:  "If the offense involved unlawfully manufacturing a 
controlled substance, or attempting to manufacture a controlled 
substance unlawfully, apply § 2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, 
Importing, Exporting, Trafficking) if the resulting offense level 
is greater than that determined above."  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11(c)(1).  
The Guidelines explain that section 2D1.11(c)(1) applies when 
"the defendant, or a person for whose conduct the defendant is 
accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), completed the 
actions sufficient to constitute the offense of unlawfully 
manufacturing a controlled substance or attempting to manufacture 
a controlled substance unlawfully."  Id. § 2D1.11, comment.(n.2).  
The relevant conduct referred to in section 1B1.3 includes "all 
acts . . . committed, aided, abetted, counselled, commanded, 
induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and in 
the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . all 
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in 
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity."  Id. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A & B). 
 Unless there is a showing of contrary intent, we must 
"follow the clear unambiguous language of the Guidelines."  
United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Therefore, we apply the Guidelines as they were written, not as 
we think they should have been written.  Id.  The district court 
had before it sufficient evidence to determine that Bogusz's 
conduct satisfied the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11(c)(1).  
  
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in its 
reliance on section 2D1.1 by cross-reference from section 2D1.11. 
 However, the use of section 2D1.11 requires us to 
consider a constitutional issue.  If the Voss majority's 
interpretation of the pre-1991 Guidelines was correct, Bogusz's 
sentence would conflict with the Ex Post Facto Clause.  U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  The prohibition against the passage 
of ex post facto laws includes, inter alia, "[e]very law that 
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than it 
was when committed."  Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390 (1798).  
In Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987), the Supreme Court, in 
striking down the use of a state sentencing guideline, held that 
an application of a sentencing provision to conduct occurring 
before its passage or promulgation violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause whenever "the law [is] retrospective, that is, it . . . 
appl[ies] to events occurring before its enactment, and . . . it 
. . . disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it."  Id. at 430 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 Bogusz was sentenced under the 1991 Guidelines for 
conduct that occurred from early April to early May 1990.  The 
1991 Guidelines became effective November 1, 1991.  Therefore, if 
the 1990 Guidelines would have resulted in a lower sentence, the 
Ex Post Facto Clause would require its application.  See United 
States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 160 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("district courts are required to apply the time-of-offense 
[G]uidelines rather than the time-of-sentence [G]uidelines when 
. . . the time-of-offense [G]uidelines are more favorable to the 
  
defendant").  Thus, if the Voss interpretation of the earlier 
Guidelines were correct, Bogusz could have received a less severe 
sentence under the pre-1991 revision of the Guidelines.  See 
Voss, 956 F.2d at 1013 (district court should base sentencing on 
the purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (1988) without regard to 
the Guidelines' sentencing table). 
 The Ex Post Facto Clause requires us to interpret the 
pre-1991 Guidelines and meet the question posed by Voss, one this 
Court has not previously decided under the pre-1991 Guidelines.  
After thorough consideration, we find ourselves in agreement with 
those courts that have rejected the view of the Voss majority.19  
Following Judge Ebel's reasoning in dissent, we hold that, under 
the pre-1991 Guidelines, violators of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(d) could 
properly be sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that application of the 1991 Guidelines did not 
disadvantage Bogusz and thus no constitutional infirmity exists 
under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 
 C.  Bogusz's Plea Bargain 
                     
19
.  See United States v. Leed, 981 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2971 (1993); United States v. Cook, 938 
F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kingston, 922 F.2d 
1234 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991); see also 
United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d 1403, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(allowing application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for 21 U.S.C.A. 
violations only when the defendant knew or could reasonably 
foresee the manufacturing quantity on which sentencing is based).  
But see United States v. Hyde, 977 F.2d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1948 (1993). 
  
 Finally, Bogusz argues that the government violated the 
terms of his plea bargain by arguing for affirmance of the 
district court's sentence in this appeal.20 
 In the plea bargain agreement between Bogusz and the 
government, the parties stipulated that the base offense level 
would be 24 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11(d)(3).  The probation office, 
in Bogusz's PSR, considered and rejected application of section 
2D1.11(d)(3) and instead recommended application of section 
2D1.11(c)(1) which, by cross-reference, requires the application 
of section 2D1.1.  The district court's decision to accept the 
PSR recommendation raised Bogusz's base offense level to 34.  
Bogusz does not appeal the district court's refusal to honor the 
stipulation, however.  See United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321 
(3d Cir. 1991) (allowing the sentencing judge to consider 
evidence outside the stipulation but requiring an opportunity for 
plea withdrawal); United States v. Wagner, 994 F.2d 1467, 1475 
(10th Cir. 1993) ("It is well settled the terms of a plea 
agreement are not binding on the sentencing court."). 
 In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the 
Supreme Court held that plea bargains are governed by the law of 
contracts and, therefore, the parties' must strictly adhere to 
                     
20
.  The government argues that Bogusz raised this issue for the 
first time in his reply brief.  In response, the government filed 
a motion to strike this argument or, in the alternative, for 
leave to file a surreply brief.  We denied these motions.  We do 
not usually consider questions first raised in this manner.  
Here, however, the issue Bogusz raises became apparent only after 
the government filed its brief.  Accordingly, Bogusz had no 
opportunity to raise it before he filed his reply brief. 
  
their promises.  United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 233 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  Courts use a three-step analysis to review plea 
bargains:  first, they determine the agreement's terms and the 
conduct alleged to violate it; second, they determine if the 
conduct violated the plea agreement; and third, if the plea 
agreement is violated, they determine the remedy.  Hayes, 946 
F.2d at 233 (quoting United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 
1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Here, the terms of the plea bargain 
are clear.  Therefore, we focus on the second step.  Determining 
whether the government's conduct violated the plea agreement is a 
question of law over which we have plenary review.  Id. 
 The stipulations attached to the plea bargain between 
Bogusz and the government state that "the applicable federal 
sentencing guideline is section 2D1.11(3) carrying a base offense 
level of 24."  The government argues that the district court was 
correct in sentencing Bogusz based on methamphetamine (actual) as 
opposed to methamphetamine.  Brief of Appellee at 41-49.  Bogusz 
claims that the government's presentation of this argument 
violates the plea agreement. 
 Bogusz's plea agreement did not explicitly address the 
post-conviction conduct of either party.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Gonzalez, 981 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992) (plea agreement 
with a no-appeal clause).  Nevertheless, because "the government 
cannot resort to a rigidly literal approach in the construction 
of language," we are not limited to the express language of the 
agreement.  Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 939 (quoting United States v. 
  
Crusco, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976)).  Rather, "[i]n determining 
whether the terms of a plea agreement have been violated, the 
court must determine whether the government's conduct is 
inconsistent with what was reasonably understood by the defendant 
when entering the plea of guilty."  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1521-22 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Waldhart v. United States, 488 U.S. 829 (1988)). 
 A reasonable person in Bogusz's position may have 
understood the stipulation to include an agreement not to argue 
against the stipulation on appeal.  Cf. Moore v. Foti, 546 F.2d 
67, 68 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendants "successful challenge to his 
plea bargained sentence is a tacit repudiation of the bargain").  
Bogusz, however, did not appeal the district court's refusal to 
follow the stipulation. 
 Moreover, the government does not directly argue 
against the stipulation; instead, it contends only that the 
district court's definition of methamphetamine (actual) is 
correct.  This issue is separate and distinct from the 
stipulation.  Similarly, Bogusz has not breached his plea 
agreement by arguing directly for his own interpretation of 
methamphetamine after he had stipulated to an unrelated 
Guidelines' provision.  Our adversarial system of justice relies 
heavily on the presentation of opposing views by both parties, on 
appeal as well as at trial.  Thus, we are reluctant to deny any 
party the right to advance its interpretation of law.  Under the 
circumstances before us, we hold that the government did not 
  
violate the letter or the spirit of the plea agreement by its 
arguments on this appeal. 
 
 IV.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons discussed above, the sentences imposed 
on Bogusz and O'Rourke will be vacated and their cases remanded 
for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion.  In 
all other respects, the orders of the district court are 
affirmed. 
U.S. v. Bogusz and O'Rourke, Nos. 92-5575 and 92-5595      
  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 I join in all parts of the majority's opinion except 
for part III(A)(1).  Because I believe the majority has adopted 
the wrong test for determining the purity of methamphetamine, I 
respectfully dissent from that portion of its opinion. 
 As the majority recognizes, the Sentencing Guidelines 
provide two ways for sentencing a defendant convicted of 
unlawfully manufacturing methamphetamine.  Under U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(c) cmt. * (1991), the court first looks to the "the entire 
weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount 
of the controlled substance."  Next, the court is instructed to 
determine the weight of the pure form of the controlled substance 
contained within the mixture, otherwise known as "methamphetamine 
(actual)."  These weights are then translated into offense levels 
by use of the Drug Quantity Table, and the higher of the two 
offense levels is used in determining the appropriate sentence. 
 The issue here is how much methamphetamine (actual) was 
contained in the substance manufactured by the defendants.  
Appellants contend that methamphetamine (actual) means only the 
amount of pure methamphetamine, free of all impurities, while the 
government argues that any uncut substance containing 
methamphetamine is methamphetamine (actual), regardless of its 
purity.  The majority, while acknowledging that both views are 
supported in the caselaw, concludes that "methamphetamine 
(actual) refers to the net amount of methamphetamine 
  
hydrochloride produced and not the gross amount of uncut 
methamphetamine."  Majority transcript at 12. 
 I disagree with this conclusion.  Precursor chemicals 
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine cost money and may be 
difficult to obtain.  Consequently, it is counterintuitive to 
conclude that every rational "cook" would not seek the highest 
possible yield of methamphetamine hydrochloride from those 
chemicals.  The mere fact that the cook bungles the recipe and 
produces a sticky, caramel-like substance of low purity, which no 
user wishes to purchase, should not diminish punishment vis-a-vis 
the "good" cook whose product is more pure and highly salable.  
 Moreover, the majority's holding also places an 
unwarranted burden upon the government to obtain an enhanced 
sentence based on the amount of methamphetamine (actual).  Under 
the majority's rule, the government must now have every sample of 
methamphetamine analyzed and its purity determined; the mere fact 
that the drug is uncut is no longer sufficient.  First, we must 
recognize that criminal defendants who operate "meth cooks" in 
garages, barns and, as here, basements, are not scientists who 
sit around discussing the molecular structure of their creations.  
Bogusz was a mechanic who got the phenylacetic acid for the 
"cook" and O'Rourke was a truck driver who cleaned out the drains 
at the "cook."  Second, "meth" is not produced under laboratory 
conditions and is almost never pure.  Third, in cases like this 
one, where the specific batch of drugs at issue is never 
  
recovered and tested, the defendant will avoid an enhanced 
sentence altogether, even when it is undisputed that the drugs 
were uncut. 
 I would simply avoid these problems altogether and hold 
that methamphetamine (actual) refers to the uncut output of the 
manufacturing process, regardless of its purity.  See United 
States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272, 1283 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 146 (1991).  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
